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The Hidden Moral Teleology in
Fichte’s System of Ethics 
Kienhow Goh
1 In Kant’s critical system of philosophy, the moral law serves both as a practical command
and as a cosmic principle. While its function as a practical command is expounded at length
in the branch of philosophy known as the metaphysics of morals, its function as a cosmic
principle is only briefly touched upon in the branch of critique known as moral teleology (as
a prelude to moral theology). One might expect the principal ethical work written by
Fichte during his glorious days in Jena – the System of Ethics (SE) – to be primarily, if not
exclusively, concerned with the law as a practical command. On this score, the work turns
out to be strikingly exceptional: it investigates the law’s function as a cosmic principle
with the hope of delivering a deduction of its applicability in the world of sense. In what
follows, I argue that Fichte harnesses the concept of the original, determinate end of a
natural thing in the deduction as a means of mediating the Kantian “supersensible idea of
the morally good” by sensible intuitions. In doing so, he is inspired above all by Kant’s
moral teleology.
 
Kant’s moral teleology
2  In his exposition of the moral proof of God’s existence in the Appendix to the Critique of
the Teleological Power of Judgment, Kant distinguishes between two forms of teleology:
physical  teleology  and  moral  teleology.  While  physical  teleology  is  based  plain-and-
simply on a theoretical consideration of nature, moral teleology has a source in human
beings considered as (practical-)rational beings. Insofar as we stand under the jurisdiction of
the pure practical law of reason, we are compelled to relate ourselves as means “to ends
and even a final end [Endzweck] that must be aimed at by us in the world” (Ak 5:4471). By
prescribing “an end without a condition,” the moral laws of reason “do exactly what the
concept of a final end requires” (Ak 5:449): they furnish us with “an objective ground” for
the nexus finalis which we can readily observed in nature – “an end which needs no other
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as the condition of its possibility” (Ak 5:434). By doing so, they put an end to the why
questions which can be raised concerning the final causes of natural things. 
3 The first thing to note about Kant’s moral teleology is that it is not a branch of practical
philosophy, but a teleology. It propounds not a way of handling (behandeln) natural things,
but a way of judging (beurteilen) them. As Kant makes clear, moral teleology concerns “the
reciprocal relation of the world to [the] moral end and the external possibility of its
accomplishment” (Ak 5:447-48). The difference is further underscored by Kant when he
draws attention to the distinctiveness of the “purposiveness of nature” from “practical
purposiveness (of human art as well as of morals)” (Ak 5:181). Practical purposiveness, he
cautions, derives from our capacity as rational beings to adopt or set ends for ourselves
with regard to objects. An “end” in this sense “is an object of the choice (of a rational
being),  through whose representation choice is determined to an action to bring this
object about” (Ak 6:381, translation modified. See also Ak 6:385). To distinguish it from
the teleological concept of a natural end, we might call it a “practical end.” As a teleology,
moral teleology is concerned with natural rather than practical ends. It is no less a natural
teleology than physical teleology is. 
4 On Kant’s view, we are already able to ascribe a “system of ends” to nature outside the
context of moral teleology. By sheer theoretical consideration of nature, we are first able
to judge some of its effects “immediately as a product of art” or “as material for the art of
other possible natural beings.” In the former case, we judge the effect as an internal end; in
the latter case, we judge it as serving some external or relative end. If the effect is judged as
serving an end of human beings, the means/end relation is one of usefulness (Nutzbarkeit);
if it is judged as serving an end of other creatures, the relation is one of advantageousness
(Zuträglichkeit) (see Ak 5:367). The concept of a natural end impels us to postulate “the
idea of the whole of nature as a system of ends” (Ak 5:379).  On the other hand, our
rational capacity to form the concept of an end for ourselves allows us to “make a system
of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things” (Ak 5:427). An end by means of
which we are able to construct such a system of ends is called an “ultimate end” (letzte
Zweck). While not every ultimate end qualifies as the final end, the final end certainly
qualifies as the ultimate end. Kant is notably unsure of whether we are entitled by a sheer
theoretical consideration of nature to ascribe relative ends – that is, relative ends taken to
be natural ends – to natural things (and by implication, a system of ends to the whole of
nature).2 As Paul Guyer puts it, “from a strictly naturalistic point of view, it is contingent
whether we see the whole of nature or any subecology in it as a teleological system, and if
we do so,  it  is arbitrary and indeterminate how we are able to see such a system as
working – that is, what is end and what is the means in it.”3 From within the context of
moral teleology, however, Kant believes we are entitled to consider the relative ends we
observe of natural things to be part of the natural scheme of things, and not artificial
ends we arbitrarily read into them.
5 Additionally,  though  Kant  is  given  to  opposing  relative  purposiveness  to  the  inner
purposiveness  that  is  characteristic  of  an  internal  end,  he  cites  “a  single  external
purposiveness that is connected with the inner purposiveness of organization and is such
that, without raising the question of for what end such an organized being must exist,
nevertheless serves in the external relation of a means to an end” (Ak 5:42). Here Kant
has in mind the means/end relation that obtains between the organization of the sexes
for the propagation of their species. Although the male and female are not “organized in
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a single body,”  they can nonetheless  be said to constitute “an organizing whole” (Ak
5:425).
 
Rethinking relative purposiveness
6  At first glance, Kant’s moral teleology seems to play no role in Fichte’s ethics. To Kant,
moral teleology is not a branch of practical philosophy and not concerned with practical
purposiveness. Its possibility turns on the assumption that natural things have relative
ends apart from the discretionary uses we freely make of them. Thus Fichte seems to rule out
its possibility when he writes: 
In nature, there is only an inner, and by no means a relative purposiveness. Relative
purposiveness first arises only through the discretionary ends a free being is able to
posit for itself in the objects of nature and is to some degree able to accomplish as
well (SW IV: 128-294).
7 Unlike  Kant  then,  Fichte  flatly  denies  that  the  concept  of  relative  purposiveness  is
applicable to natural things themselves apart from the discretionary uses we freely make
of them. For him, relative purposiveness is an instance of practical purposiveness rather
than an instance of the purposiveness of nature. This is especially evident in Section 15
(Subsection V), where he writes that the purposiveness – that is, relative purposiveness5 –
of an object is nothing but “its usability [Brauchbarkeit] for certain arbitrary [beliebigen]
ends that one might set for oneself with regard to this object” (SW IV: 171, translation
modified). Accordingly, Hegel remarks of Fichte’s teleology that it “represents everything
which manifests itself naturally as existing for the sake of something else, namely to
create a realm for free beings and to allow itself to be shattered so that free beings may
rise above the ruins and fulfil their destiny.”6 Nature assumes the guise of purposiveness
only in the light of its practical relationship to us.
8 Nevertheless, I think we miss a great deal of what is interesting about Fichte’s theory of
purposiveness by approaching it in terms of Kant’s concept of practical purposiveness
(viz., functionality of objects for ends we set for ourselves). Throughout the SE, Fichte
repeatedly draws attention to the difference of the practical ends we are compelled to posit
by the necessity of reason from the practical ends we are free to posit by sheer play of the
power of imagination. Unlike the former, the latter is firmly anchored in an original,
determinate system of ends unified as means to the unconditioned “end of reason” (viz.,
“idea of  the pure I”).  According to Fichte,  “the purposiveness  of the sensible world is
present for a human being only insofar as and only because he is able to set goals for
himself,  and he is able to do this only because his own reason provides him with an
absolutely final goal (viz., morality)” (GA I/6: 413, translation modified7).8 In this light, not
every end we imagine by wishful thinking counts for the “discretionary ends” that give
rise to relative purposiveness. The relative ends of natural things are ends which are given
only through the original, determinate system of ends in the following sense: they are either
identifiable with the ends of the system or derivable from them.
9  First of all, Fichte recognizes a smaller class of relative ends than Kant. In the deduction
of the human body (as an organized product of nature) in Section 8, Fichte ventures to
revise the Kantian theory of organized systems on the basis of the Kantian insight that
the parts of an organized system are characterized by their dependence on each other
and on the whole.9 An important result of the revision is that the relations that obtain
between the parts of an organized being come to be regarded as essentially the same as
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those that obtain between organized beings (as well as between organized beings and raw
matter). The whole of nature becomes “a self-grounding whole, complete within itself;
and  precisely  for  this  reason,  it  becomes  an  organized  and  organizing  whole  which
possesses within itself and within its own immanent the ground of all the phenomena
that occur within it” (SW V: 179-80).10 Recall that Kant cites a single instance of relative
purposiveness  that  does  not  fit  the bill  –  namely,  the propagative  end of  the sexes’
organization. By reconstruing nature as “an organized and organizing whole,” Fichte in
effect takes the single instance as a paradigm for explaining advantageousness. Granted
that  the  kind  of  purposiveness  Kant  classifies  under  advantageousness is  really  inner
rather than relative purposiveness, relative purposiveness amounts to nothing but what
Kant means by usefulness.
10  Admittedly, when Fichte equates the purposiveness of an object with its usability for our
arbitrary ends, he seems to think that natural things have no relative ends apart from the
discretionary uses we freely make of them. But this interpretation cannot be sustained
upon a careful reading of Section 17 (Subsection IV) of the SE. Here I will cite the crucial
passage in two parts. The first part speaks to what the “final end” (Endzweck) of a natural
thing is:
a determinate object is posited only in consequence of some determinate limitation
of a drive; it is posited in order to explain this limitation. If the drive itself, qua
drive, is posited (as a longing or desiring) and is referred to the object, then one
obtains what the I wants to bring about in the object, what the I might use the
object for; i.e., one obtains the thing’s original, determinate end – which is by no
means the same thing as an end one has arbitrarily  [willkürlich]  posited for the
object. (SW IV: 210, translation modified) 
11 The drive in question is the “original drive” (Urtrieb). Each natural thing is posited by the
I in the first place in order to explain the limitation of the original drive. On this basis, we
are entitled to regard the end obtained by the I when it refers the drive to the natural
thing as “the thing’s original, determinate end” – what the thing is meant as it were to be
used for. This so-called “final end” of a natural thing must not be confounded with the
unconditioned final end of the whole of nature – the self-sufficiency of reason or idea of the
pure I. 
12 The second part of the passage speaks to how the final end of a natural thing is related to
its usability as such: 
It follows from the preceding remark, however, that every arbitrary [willkürliche]
end is at the same time an original one; or, to put it more clearly, it follows that I
am at least unable to achieve any end that is not demanded by an original drive. But
it is quite possible for me to apprehend only a part of my original drive when it
aims  at  an  object,  and  in  that  case,  I  grasp  only  a  portion  of  the  thing’s
purposiveness. (SW IV: 210) 
13 Kant himself suggests such a relationship of an arbitrary to an original end when he
remarks that an “action which is morally absolutely necessary can be regarded physically
as entirely contingent (i.e., what necessarily ought to happen often does not)” (Ak 5:403n,
translation modified). It turns on the thought that if an action or end X ought to be, then
X can but need not be, and if X need not be, then ~X as well as X can be. In this way, no final
end of a thing is given as a possible end except together with a cluster of other possible
ends.  Fichte’s  contention then is  that  the  entire  cluster  of  the  thing’s  possible  ends
exhausts its usability.11
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The significance of moral teleology 
14  Even as Fichte undercuts Kant’s moral teleology by denying that natural things have
relative ends apart from the discretionary uses we freely make of them, he reintroduces it
at the higher level as part of a theory of practical purposiveness. By this theory, not every
end we can think up or will by a “sheer empty willing” (SW IV: 73) is an end we can
actually will (wollen) and realize (wirken) in the world of sense. Although both classes of
ends  are  marked  by  their  “thinkability”  (Denkbarkeit),  the  latter  class  of  ends  is
distinguished from the former by their “perceptibility” (Wahnehmbarkeit) or “capacity to
be  sensed”  (Empfindbarkeit).  To  be  sure,  we  exercise  our  power  of  choice  by  freely
choosing from among a manifold of possible ends. In doing so, however, we choose only
from among possible ends which are given through the final ends of natural things as parts of
an original, determinate system of ends.
15  At the outset, I have suggested that Fichte’s approach to the deduction of the moral law’s
applicability in the SE is prompted by Kant’s moral teleology. This is suggested in a note
to Collegium über die Moral, where he identifies the “purposiveness of nature” as key to the
“matter  [Materie]  of  the  moral  law”  (see  GA  IV/1:41).  To  appreciate  the  latter’s
significance, we need to first elucidate the problem he seeks to solve by the deduction,
and how the final ends of natural things contribute to solving it. 
16  In Kantian ethics, one typically assumes that the applicability of the moral law concerns
its practical employment as a discursive criterion for moral actions. But in his discussion
of the object of pure practical reason in Chapter Two of the Analytic of Practical Reason,
Kant in fact raises two distinct questions: the first which we might call the “question of
schematism” is the transcendental one concerning how the “supersensible idea of the
morally good” can be “presented [dargestellt] in concreto in a sensible intuition” (Ak 5:68);
the  second  which  we  might  call  the  “question  of  appraisal”  is  the  practical  one
concerning how actions in conformity with duty can be told apart from actions which are
not (Ak 5:69). According to Kant, the question of schematism is unanswerable because we
simply have no a priori intuition by means of which to mediate a supersensible idea by a
sensible intuition. Notwithstanding, an adequate answer to the question of appraisal can
be given in terms of the typic of a universal law of nature. By applying the mere typic of
the law, we are able to judge whether an action is our moral duty without having to have
recourse to the presentation of the idea of the good in concreto in sensible intuitions. 
17  In response, Fichte insists that the question of schematism cannot be avoided because we
would be at a loss in applying the law if we did not know where in the world of sense the
law is to be applied. The applicability of the law presupposes the availability of answers to
the questions:
To which domain of the sensible world do the demands made upon me by the moral
law refer?  How am I  supposed  to  recognize  this  domain  in  general,  and  do  so
systematically? How am I even supposed to recognize how I ought to work upon
each determinate object within this domain in accordance with the moral law –
how I ought to work upon precisely this A and this B, etc.? (SW IV: 66, translation
modified)
18 The fact that we are not at a loss in applying the law only goes to show that the typic is
already “actually operative” (SW I: 506) as a constitutive principle in our everyday life.12 A
deduction of the moral law’s applicability is only left with the task of showing that (and
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how) this is so. In all fairness, we can say that the deduction addresses not so much the
question of appraisal as the question of schematism.13
19 Agreeing with Kant that we have no a priori intuition by means of which to mediate the
idea  of  the  good by  a  sensible  intuition,  Fichte  sees  an  alternative  approach to  the
question of schematism in Kant’s moral teleology. Kant suggests it when he remarks that
moral teleology 
is just as necessarily connected with the nomothetic of freedom on the one hand and
that of nature on the other as civil legislation is connected with the question of
where the executive  power should be  sought,  and with the general  question of  how
reason is to provide a principle of reality of a certain lawful order of things that is
possible only in accordance with ideas (Ak 5:448, emphases added). 
20 But alas, the promise (if there is one) turns out to be empty! For Kant, the moral law can
be universally enforced (allgemeingeltend) as a cosmic principle only by means of a morally
impeccable and supremely powerful and intelligent Person. Since we have no systemic
epistemic  access  to  the  workings  of  such a  divine  Person,  moral  teleology leaves  us
practically clueless as to where the executive power of the nomothetic of freedom is to be
sought. Thus Kant’s moral teleology turns out to have no relevance for mediating the idea
of the good by sensible intuitions. 
21 Notwithstanding,  Fichte  is  summoned  by  Kant’s  suggestive  remark  to  explore  the
possibility of accomplishing the task by means of the concept of the original, determinate end
of a natural thing. In the hope of doing so, he advances the controversial thesis that the
law  is  actually  operative  in  ordinary  consciousness  as  “a  theoretical  principle  for  the
determination of the world” (SW IV: 68). As is clear from our examination of Section 17
(Subsection 14), we acquire cognition of the final ends of natural things when the I refers
the original drive to the things. Now the original drive is none other than the concept of
morality (or freedom) considered as a transcendental law (viz., law of reason as such).
Inasmuch as the I refers it to natural things, the concept comes into play as a theoretical
principle. From Section 15, we know that the exact power of cognition involved in the
process  is  the  reflecting  power  of  judgment.  The  claim  then  is  that  through  our
immediate feeling of the harmony/disharmony of the varying reflecting judgments we
pass upon natural things with the drive, we are able to settle upon a stable cognition of
what each thing is meant to be used for (viz., how it is meant to be handled). In this way, the
normative authority of what each thing is meant to be used for is immediately felt. Of
course, this does not mean that we cannot choose to act contrary to it. But it does mean
that we cannot choose to act contrary to it without getting into trouble with ourselves
and with others. 
22  Although  Fichte  does  not  set  out  to  give  an  exhaustive  list  of  these  “original
determinations” (Urbestimmungen), it is safe to say that he has in mind at least (i) the
contingency of our world, (ii) the articulation of our body, and (iii) the rationality of some
other beings. Inasmuch as we are conscious of our world as contingent, we cognize that
natural things are meant to be used solely as tools (Werkzeugen) for advancing our goals. As
contingency  is  essentially  modifiability,  consciousness  of  our  world  as  contingent
amounts  to  consciousness  of  an  invitation to  act  upon it.  Also,  inasmuch as  we  are
conscious of our body as articulated, we cognize that our body is meant to be used in the
same way. We misuse it by using it for the sole end of sensual enjoyment. In other words,
our body as well as the whole of nature have us for their final ends. On the other hand,
inasmuch as we are conscious of some other beings as rational, we cognize them not only
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as not being meant to be used solely as tools for advancing our goals, but as being meant
not to be used in this way. When the I refers the original drive to a “product of artifice” 
(including  the  body of  another  rational  being),  it  finds  the  drive  to  be  limited  in  a
“particular and characteristic” way: its very drive to act “is repulsed” (SW IV: 225). 
23 By a deduction of the moral law’s applicability, the final ends of our world, our body and
other rational beings are shown to be grounded in a transcendental law (or, what is the
same, the original drive). Moreover, their normative authority derives from the fact that
the law in question is the moral law. In this light, there is no tautology in stating the
demand of the moral law as follows: Handle each natural thing in accordance with (your
cognition of) what it is meant to be used for. In Fichte’s eyes, this way of fleshing out the
law’s  demand  marks  an  improvement  over  Kant’s  formulas  primarily  because  it
simultaneously specifies the domain of the world of sense where the demand is to be met.
As he puts it,  it  determines not only “the idea of what we ought to do,” but also “the
substrate in which we ought to approximate the realization of this idea” (SW IV: 70).
NOTES
1. Ak is  short  for  Immanuel  Kant  Schriften.  Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gryuter, 1902-. 
2. “We  have  said  that  the  external  purposiveness  of  natural  things  offers  no  sufficient
justification for using them at the same time as ends of nature, as grounds for the explanation of
their existence, and using their contingently purposive effects, in the idea, as grounds for their
existence in accordance with the principle of final causes” (Ak 5:377. See also Ak 5:367-69).
3. Paul Guyer, “Kant’s Principles of Reflecting Judgment,” Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment:
Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 52.
4. SW is short for Fichtes Sammtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel H. Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1970).
5. Fichte tends to use the term purposiveness exclusively to mean relative purposiveness, and does
not regard inner purposiveness as purposiveness proper speaking.
6. Georg  W.  F.  Hegel,  “Glauben  und  Wissen,”  Erste  Druckschriften,  ed.  Georg  Lasson  (Leipzig:
Meiner, 1928), 334-35, translation is mine. Likewise, Arnold Farr notes that the reflecting power
of judgment by which we think of nature as purposive “tells us nothing about nature and does
not  affect  nature  but  only  affects  the  human  subject.”  Farr,  “Reflecting  Judgment  and  the
Boundaries of Finite Human Knowledge: The Path toward Fichte’s 1794/95 Wissenschaftslehre,” 
New Essays in Fichte’s Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge, ed. Dan Breazeale
and Tom Rockmore (New York: Humanity Books, 2001), 107.
7. GA is short for J. G. Fichte – Gesammtausgabe, ed. Reinhard Lauth and Hans Gliwitzky (Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1962-).
8. Daniel  Breazeale’s  separate  treatment  of  our  practical  dominion  over  nature  and  our
consciousness  of  nature’s  final  end is  somewhat misleading as  it  suggests  that  the former is
possible without the latter. See Breazeale, “Against Nature? On the Status and Meaning of the
Natural World in Fichte’s Early Wissenschaftslehre,” Philosophia Osaka, No. 9, Mar 2014: 29-34. As I
understand Fichte, our cultural and technical mastery of natural things has to presuppose some
consciousness, however obscure, of their final ends. 
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9. The insight is concisely stated at two points in the Foundation of Natural Right (FNR) (see SW III:
203, 208-09).
10. See also SW IV: 124.
11. One cannot help but marvel at the consistency with the critique of Rousseau in the fifth
lecture of Some Lectures of the Vocation of a Scholar. There Fichte agrees with Rousseau that culture
entails the development of sensibility and its needs, and makes possible vice and corruption. But
it also makes possible virtue and reason. By abolishing culture, we eradicate vice and corruption.
But we thereby also eradicate virtue and reason (see SW VI: 340-41). Likewise, Fichte shows here
how  the  possibility  of  virtue  and  reason  (X)  must  give  rise  to  the  possibility  of  vice  and
corruption (~X).
12. The  same  point  is  made  in  Fichte’s  critique  in  the  FNR of  the  Kantian  formula  of  the
categorical imperative “Act so that the maxim of your will can be the principle of a universal
legislation” (see SW III: 80-81). Barbara Herman seems to have reached a similar conclusion about
what she argues that the categorical imperative (CI) “cannot be an effective practical principle of
judgment unless agents have some moral understanding of their actions before they use the CI
procedure.” Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1993, 77.
13. Commentators are generally agreed that one looks in vain for a discursive criterion for moral
actions in the SE. See Daniel Breazeale, “In Defense of Fichte’s Account of Ethical Deliberation,”
Archives  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie (Berlin:  Walter  de  Gruyter,  2012),  199,  and Allen  Wood,
Fichte’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 137-38, 149.
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inspired above all by Kant’s moral teleology. This concerns, not the metaphysics of morals as
practical philosophy but moral teleology (as a prelude to moral theology). By a deduction of the
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